Federalist
The Federalist Papers The first system of government put into place in America, The Articles of Confederation had failed. The Articles lacked a strong national government, executive branch, unified currency, and national judicial system. The Federalist Papers provided strong and rational justifications for the choices made by the Constitutional Convention, which called for the people to give up some power in order to live under the protection of a strong national government. The''Federalist Papers'' is a series of essays that appeared in a New York newspaper, The Independent Journal, ''beginning in October 1787. Authors Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay wrote 85 essays under the penname''Publius. The essays employed rhetoric and appeals to patriotism to convince the people that a strong, centralized government would better serve them and protect their liberties. Prior to the ratification of the Constitution, The''Federalist Papers'', which arose from the ratification debates, had a profound influence on the final draft. through the illustration of the necessary components of a national government that were absent in the Articles of Confederation, adherence to Republican principles, and the virtues of a national government, The Federalist Papers were able to persuade the states to vote unanimously for the foundation of a new government. The driving force behind the development of the Federalist Papers was the ineffectuality of the Articles of Confederation; this supported the promotion of a strong national government within the Federalist Papers with a focus on the utility of the union, Republican Principles, and the virtues of a strong national government. Unification is Important for the Maintenance of One's Rights and Popular Sovereignty ' The delegates who attended the Constitutional Convention in 1787 all believed in the principle of natural equality. They wanted to secure the natural right of liberty to all citizens. In order to do so, the Anti-Federalist held the view that states rights were the key to securing justice for those who fought for liberty. The Federalists, however, believed that a unity in a strong central government would lead to a better functioning structure that could better secure the needs of the nation. Among the Federalists were the outspoken authors of The ''Federalist Papers, Hamilton, Madison, and Jay. Under the pseudonym Publius, they articulated, through a series of essays, how crucial maintaining the union is. With long established views against him, Publius finds himself fighting an uphill battle to prove republics should not be small. There were a number of Anti-Federalists who were scared of a big national government with a strong president. They were much more on the side of State’s rights. The defenders of a small national government were for small republics. They defended and were influenced by the Aristotelian ideal. Small numbers could keep a better eye on the governors, and thus secure justice. While Jefferson championed this divided republic, Publius tried to bring the nation toward the modern world, which would require a united republic. Prior to discussing the need for a union and the inconveniences that would result from a divided nation, Publius reminds his readers that they are already united on several grounds. John Jay, in Federalist No. 2, advocates the idea that there is and can be national unity. Common identity is already present in the people, land, and history. The people of the states all arrive from the same culture, that is, they have the same ancestors. Having the same background means that they all share language, culture, and in many cases, religion. In addition, their residual area is a unified land with little barriers to keep them divided. Most importantly, they all fought side by side for the same cause in the Revolution. Nothing brings a people together like a war. If people were divided before the Revolution, they were now certainly unified through the experience of fighting for the same thing and adhering to the same principle of liberty. As such, division would be unnatural for a people that are already united. Not only is union already natural, but it is also important for the preservation and perpetuation of the blessings of liberty. This idea is further elucidated in Federalists 3-5, where Jay discusses the advantages of Union for international relations. Jay held that the less divided a nation was, the less wars, or conflicts, the nation would have internally. Unification would result in trade agreements and treaties, which would quell the reasons for war between the states. Disagreements would be settled in a much less violent manner and with greater ease. In addition, other countries would take a unified nation more consideration and respect. Wars on a unified nation would be less frequent because a unified nation would have greater economic progress, and thus attain more power. The weakness that would occur from disunion would only serve to invite invasion. Behind Publius’ conviction that unity was essential, was the underlying belief that the citizen had certain unalienable rights. The authors built upon the ideas of the great political theorists of the past. Lock, whose influence is most apparent in the Constitution, did not just influence the authors, but also the delegates as a whole. They all believed in that the end of government was to protect one’s rights and maintain of popular sovereignty. Dissention opinions arose from the question of what sort of government would best maintain and uphold one’s rights. Like Hobbes, Publius believed in the knavish tendencies of the citizen. In Federalist No. 6, Hamilton stresses the need for a union based on a Hobbesian view of human nature. Based on the perception that humans are fundamentally bad, Hamilton believes that disunited States would most certainly lead to violent competition and injustice. Each State would only look out for itself, which would hurt, rather than help, the people as a whole. Under the same belief, Hamilton critiques the idea that commerce can overcome some of the conflicts that would arise from competing states. Since each individual is self-loving, commerce could do little to bind together factions. Ones inclination to do what is best for his or herself always outbids the inclination to do what is best for justice. Establishing the importance of unification is the most important foundation for the ratification of the Constitution. Publius appeals to his readers by reminding them that they are a people similar in many fashions, and so they are already united. Disunion would not only be unnatural, but it would also result in conflicts, both internally and externally. In order to maintain liberty and justice for all, all must be unified. '''Maintaining Republican Principles A critical feature of the Constitution for the Federalists was adherence to republican principles. Succinctly, a republic is “a government which derives all its powers directly or indirectly from the great body of the people, and it is administered by persons holding their offices during pleasure for a limited period, or during good behavior” (Publius 237). Part of this concern rose from the need to garner the vote of the anti-federalists as well as establish the promotion of equality and faithful representation, contrasting the monarchal tyranny the colonists had fought just years before. In summation, Federalist beliefs about the dynamic between states in a Republic were that “the genius of Republics is pacific; the spirit of commerce has a tendency to soften the manners of men, and to extinguish those inflammable humors which have so often kindled into wars… They will be governed by mutual interest, and will cultivate s mutual spirit of amity and concord.” (Publius 50) Representation and Population To counteract Publius’s fears of a large government, and its potential to ruin the state of equality all of the delegates of the Constitutional Convention debates sought to protect, he attempted to distribute power and avoid its concentration. He believed this could be accomplished by having a larger body of representation to dilute the passions of the citizens. “In a republic people assemble and administer it by their representatives and agents… a republic may be extended over a large region.” (Publius 95) In using electives as agents of the people the issues of mass deliberations and inefficiencies of a pure democracy are essentially nullified. Through the newfound efficiency and flexibility, convening is made easier and allows the people to have their interests represented in their absence. Further, the extreme and passionate are overwhelmed by the numbers of the representation, keeping them from carrying the day. Safeguarding against the Majority Publius’s other main fear is the ability of a majority to form in the representative bodies where they may gain a majority and overlook the various other interests in the community. He remedied this by asserting that the diversity of the representation and the size alone will hinder any one interest’s ability to concentrate power, and force them into compromise to achieve their ends, which will require that multiple interests concur before action is taken. In essence the people and their elected check themselves in assembly. Reconciliation of the Need for Power and the Tendency to its Abuse Publius wanted the national government to have the ability to fulfill its enumerated responsibilities which required the legitimate power to coerce states and individuals. He held firmly that to only have the ability to coerce the states would lead to conflict and war amongst the states, it was essential that the national government coerce both the states and the individuals. Through competition, and checking, he hoped that the states and national government necessarily clashing interests would be satiated by these dynamics. Citizens will have stronger attachment to the states and thusly the states will be more adamantly supported. In addition, the branches of government will avidly guard against encroachments by others keeping any one department from absorbing another. Publius also supported the already accepted state constitutions and ideas regarding elections and terms. “According to all the constitutions, also, the tenure of the highest offices is extended to a definite period, and in many instance, both within the legislative and executive departments, to a period of years.” (Publius 237) Terms hold the elected accountable to the people and elections act as a mechanism to constantly integrate the wants of the constituency into the national assembly. Federalist Papers as an extension of Locke and a Critique of Hobbes Clearly Locke’s views on a limited government derived from the consent of the governed who are to be fairly represented in assembly through election is not difficult to draw from the Federalist Papers. He forwarded similar propositions to protect against the potential abuses of the government in his continuance throughout his works of popular sovereignty which is arguably administered not only directly in the Federalist Papers but with the attention paid to state sovereignty throughout its proceedings to maintain the interest of the anti-federalists. It is important to note that the Federalists did not want to dismissal of state governments by any means. They wanted an effective national authority that could provide the duties and power necessary to protect the union from internal and foreign threats that states outside of a confederation cannot feasibly accomplish. Hobbes’s Monarch found no solace in the Federalist Papers, namely because his single sovereign is the incontestable authority, most importantly authority by decree, rather than standing law. The fundamental foundation of the republic is having the community administer its own laws with a sort of concurrence in all things through representation, as opposed to a full vote of confidence and unlimited term exhibited by the Monarch. The delegates to the Constitutional Convention debates had faith in the people to understand well enough the affairs of their stations to vote properly. With their vote they forward their demands to the government in the form of the elected which are under threat of competition not only in the legislature as a means to protect the faithfulness of representation, but outside of it as well during each new election. The Republic as the Bridge to the “Citizen” If we extend the “knave” as man’s selfish tendencies, which are difficult to avoid and are better moderated than altogether altered or avoided, the citizen is necessarily, a man without such pervasive tendencies- though many would argue they are inescapable - or the knave reformed into a citizen under a republic. It is requisite that citizens have an understanding of their political affairs and have a way to enter into them, provided they have the accessibility that helps them forward their interests. The citizen of any state assumedly has an ability to participate in the honors and emoluments of office as well as an understanding of them. The republic provides both of these in its elections of representatives and the preservation of the state governments which have the immediacy and proximity vital to the understanding of the electing body and accessible enough to incite public interest. That interest in the community and seeking to attain an understanding of the community, are what counterbalance the knavish tendencies, and gradually transition the knave into the citizen under a republic. In effect, the republican government has provisions enough to offer to each individual a voice in public affairs, so that they can annex their concerns for themselves in relation to their community to their representative and focus on their contribution afterward, instead of constantly transgressing others for the fulfillment of their demands in society. This is not to say though, that the knave is absent through the republic, but rather he may find salvation in it, and move toward citizenship. Virtues of the National Government: Stability, Energy, & Republicanism Publius realized there were some distinct challenges facing the Convention concerning balance. The Articles of Confederation lacked a certain energy that is necessary for government to swiftly secure the nation against internal and external danger. However, this energy usually comes in conflict with the liberties of the people. The new constitution would also need to provide a way to balance the power between the Federal and State governments and to ensure that population differences between small and large states did not cause divergences. In order to maintain stability and energy, there must be a separation of powers between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. Publius believed that the Legislative branch was the most important in a representative republic because it stood for the direct will of the people. Consequently, the Legislative branch must be divided into distinct parts that differ by number of members and mode of election. The Senate embodies the virtue of stability because every state is given the same number of representatives and those representatives serve for longer periods. The House of Representatives embodies republicanism because representation is derived from population and shorter terms make representatives more accountable to the people. The President embodies the virtues of Energy because one single hand is charged with the nation’s security. If you divide the powers of government, something must be done to regulate these powers and ensure that they will not encroach upon each other. Publius believed that external enforcement was ineffective. The government should be structured so that it regulates itself. “If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.” (Federalist 51)